PREPA’s Debt Restructuring – What’s Next?

PREPA’s Debt Restructuring – What’s Next?

Published on March 24, 2022 / Leer en español

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Policy Director
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Introduction

On March 8, 2022, the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (“AAFAF”), issued a notification stating it was terminating the Definitive Restructuring Support Agreement (the “PREPA RSA”), dated as of May 3, 2019, as amended, by and among (1) the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”), (2) AAFAF, (3) the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (“FOMB”), (4) the members of the Ad Hoc Group of PREPA Bondholders, (5) Assured Guaranty Corp. and Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp., (6) Syncora Guarantee Inc., (7) National Public Finance Guarantee Corporation, and (8) any other persons who had joined the PREPA RSA as of that date.

The purpose of the PREPA RSA was to restructure certain bonds issued by PREPA. In our view, the PREPA RSA was not a good transaction for Puerto Rico. Its terms and conditions were overly generous to creditors; it discouraged the transition to distributed renewable generation; there was uncertainty as to whether it provided the debt relief necessary to maintain PREPA as a going concern, while avoiding another restructuring in the short to medium term; and would have, in all likelihood, resulted in a significant rate increase for Puerto Rican ratepayers for decades to come.

In this policy brief, we take a look at the current state of PREPA’s debt restructuring process and offer some recommendations about what a good PREPA debt restructuring transaction should (and shouldn’t) include.

Procedural Status

Judge Laura Taylor Swain, also on March 8, issued an Order Denying Urgent Motion of the Ad Hoc Group of PREPA Bondholders to Appoint a Mediator and Impose Deadlines for a PREPA Plan of Adjustment and Directing Additional Consultation and Filings,[1] (the “March 8 Order”).

The March 8 Order denied “the Ad Hoc Group’s Motion insofar as it seeks an order requiring the Oversight Board to participate in, and PREPA to provide unlimited financing for, mediation focused on the interests of a particular subset of creditors under the provision of an RSA that AAFAF has purportedly terminated.”[2]

The Court, however, encouraged the relevant parties to “continue discussions and pursue a consensual resolution of the outstanding issues” and stated that it would be willing to consider “a prompt consensual revival of a private mediation proposal” if such proposal is “accompanied by a delineation of scope, a timetable, and evidence of the proposal’s commercial reasonableness, susceptibility to cost controls, and consistency with any relevant requirements of the Puerto Rico Recovery Accuracy in Disclosures Act (“PRRADA”).[3]

To that end, the Court ordered the FOMB to “promptly meet and confer with AAFAF, the Ad Hoc Group of Bondholders, and all other major stakeholders and interested parties whose collaboration it believes is necessary to construct a viable basis for a plan of adjustment, to consider whether a consensual mediation arrangement can be entered into promptly to resolve key plan-related issues.”[4] Any mediation proposal submitted for Court approval must comply with the criteria set forth above. The FOMB and AAFAF have until March 18, 2022 to submit a status report regarding this matter.

In addition, the Court ordered the FOMB to file by May 2, 2022:

  • “A proposed plan of adjustment, disclosure statement, and proposed deadlines in connection with consideration of the disclosure statement, plan-related discovery, solicitation and tabulation of votes, objection period in connection with the confirmation hearing, and proposed confirmation hearing schedule for the PREPA Title III case; or
  • A detailed term sheet for a plan of adjustment, with a proposed timetable for the filing of the plan, consideration and approval of a disclosure statement, voting and confirmation of the plan; or
  • A proposed schedule for the litigation of significant disputed issues in PREPA’s Title III case, including, without limitation, the motion for stay relief to seek appointment of a receiver, the UCC’s claim objection (including, if appropriate, litigation of antecedent questions of standing), and the issues raised in Adv. Proc. Nos. 19-396 and 19-405; or
  • A declaration and memorandum of law showing cause as to why the court should not consider dismissal of PREPA’s Title III case for failure to demonstrate that a confirmable plan of adjustment can be formulated and filed within a time period consistent with the best interests of PREPA, the parties-in-interest and the people of Puerto Rico.”[5]

On March 9, 2022, the Honorable Rafael Hernández, Speaker of the House of Representatives of Puerto Rico, sent a letter to the FOMB “expressing the House’s interest in participating in the mediation process regarding PREPA’s plan of adjustment.”[6]

On March 14, 2022, the FOMB replied that the “Oversight Board does not anticipate developing or negotiating a PREPA plan of adjustment requiring legislation. But, if that changes, the Oversight Board would welcome the Legislature’s participation in mediation if such a restructuring proposal is developed.”[7]

On March 16, 2022, the Court entered another Order (the “March 16 Order”) amending the March 8 Order, indicating “[t]he Court is exploring whether a judicial mediator or mediation team can be made available to facilitate development of a plan of adjustment for PREPA and the resolution of related litigation.”[8]

Analysis of the Procedural Options

In our view, it is clear from the language of the March 8 Order that Judge Taylor Swain favors a consensual resolution of the major pending issues prior to the FOMB submitting a plan of adjustment for PREPA. Hence her order that the FOMB determine the feasibility of setting up a mediation process in consultation with AAFAF, the Ad Hoc Group of Bondholders, and “all other major stakeholders and interested parties whose collaboration it believes is necessary” to develop a plan of adjustment.

In theory, the group of “major stakeholders and interested parties” would include, at a minimum, the following parties: (1) PREPA; (2) AAFAF; (3) the FOMB; (4) the Ad Hoc Group of PREPA Bondholders; (5) Assured Guaranty Corp. and Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp.; (6) Syncora Guarantee Inc.; (7) National Public Finance Guarantee Corporation; (8) PREPA’s Fuel Line Lenders; (9) a representative of PREPA’s current retirees and future beneficiaries of PREPA’s pension plan; and (10) a representative of PREPA’s unsecured creditors.

Who else might be deemed a “necessary party” seems to be up to the FOMB to decide. Based on its letter to Speaker Hernández it appears the FOMB will apply a narrow definition to determine who is a “necessary” party to the mediation proceedings. That is, it appears the FOMB would be limiting participation in any mediation process only to those parties strictly required to develop a plan of adjustment.

That would be a pity, for while we understand that there is a negative tradeoff between expediency and the number of parties at the negotiating table, there are also some advantages to integrating a broader set of stakeholders and interested parties into the negotiating process. To the extent any proposed plan of adjustment has significant support among civic society organizations, NGOs, and the various trade guilds, the easier it would be to implement. While, on the other hand, presenting PREPA’s clients, essentially everybody in Puerto Rico, with a plan they don’t understand as a fait accompli, on a take it or leave it basis, is likely to generate resistance and opposition.

Mediation is also preferable to the available alternatives to a negotiated settlement. In the instant case, those alternatives are the litigation of complex issues of law and fact, which could take literally years when appeals are factored in, or the dismissal of the Title III case, in which case bondholders and other creditors would seek to exercise their rights pursuant to the terms and conditions of the relevant credit documents. PREPA’s bondholders, for example, would be entitled to request the appointment of a receiver to manage and operate PREPA and to require the enforcement of the rate covenant of the 1974 Trust Agreement, pursuant to which PREPA’s rates would have to be set at a level that generates sufficient revenues to cover all operating expenses plus 120% of annual debt service.

Finally, the FOMB has the option to develop a plan of adjustment with the support of only one class of creditors and seek a court order to “cramdown” all the other creditors, pursuant to section 314(c) of PROMESA. This option, while theoretically possible, is highly unlikely to be endorsed by Judge Taylor Swain, who has demonstrated a clear preference for consensual solutions throughout all Title III proceedings.

In sum, then, an inclusive mediation process would be the best path forward to “construct the basis for a confirmable plan of adjustment for PREPA”. No doubt, it would be a complicated and tough negotiating process and the timeline set by the Judge is rather tight. Nonetheless, if all the parties act in “good faith and in a focused manner”, it should be possible to present the Court with at least a detailed term sheet for a plan of adjustment by May 2, as requested by Judge Taylor Swain.

Substantive Recommendations

The FOMB has usually defended prior proposals for PREPA’s debt restructuring in narrow terms. Perhaps it is legally required to do so. It has stated in the past that its main objective is to ensure any plan of adjustment for PREPA meets the requirements for confirmation set forth in PROMESA. However, any transaction that affects a sector as important as electricity is to the Puerto Rican economy needs to be evaluated in a thorough manner.

Therefore, any plan of adjustment for PREPA has to be comprehensive in nature and take into account the economic and social environment in which PREPA operates. This means that any plan of adjustment must take the following factors into account: (1) PREPA operates in an economy that has shown little or no growth for 15 years; (2) it operates in an island with a declining population and a shrinking industrial base; (3) high fuel costs and general inflationary pressures are expected to prevail in the short to medium term due to the aftermath of the Covid-19 epidemic and the war in Ukraine; (5) interest rates are expected to rise as central banks seek to lower inflation around the globe; (6) Puerto Rico has a fragile transmission and distribution system that needs, essentially, to be entirely rebuilt; (7) PREPA operates an aging fossil fuel generation fleet, with an average age of 40 years and some units approaching 60 years, which is close to the end of their useful life; (8) PREPA is run by a largely ineffective management team, which has been tainted by corruption in the past, and traditionally has been led by political appointees; and (9) PREPA is currently a bankrupt utility without access to the capital markets.

These operational risks translate into financial risks such as the following, which should be taken into account when restructuring PREPA’s debt:

  • Pension liabilities, if not restructured, could result in a 3.4 cent/kWh increase by 2034.[9]
  • Inefficient dispatch of generation could raise rates by 1.08 cents/kWh to 1.28 [10] cents/kWh a year.
  • PREPA has not been fully transparent about the full extent of T&D investment required over the long term to achieve both its resiliency and renewable generation goals. PREPA’s certified 2019 Fiscal Plan states it will need to make capital expenditures on the T&D system of $8.2 billion between 2020 and 2024 plus an additional $8.2 billion between 2025 and 2030. But that is only for resilience, in order to incorporate large amounts of distributed generation it will need to make an additional investment of $13.6 billion between 2030 and 2035. London Economics International (“LEI”), a consulting firm, estimates the federal government will pay 90% of the first $16.4 billion, but that the other $13.6 billion would have to be recuperated through higher customer rates. [11]
  • Finally, according to its FY2019 Fiscal Plan, PREPA needs to make a series of capital investments in order to reduce its dependency on oil and reduce its operating costs, and those investments will have to be financed and repaid in some way. PREPA’s poor financial condition will raise the cost of financing investments in new renewable generation. This means that ratepayers will have to pay for those costs through long-term power purchase and operating agreements (“PPOAs”), which will need to be included in customer rates. According to LEI, it is possible that the costs of the PPOAs may not be completely offset by reduced use of fossil fuels. [12]

Second, a restructured PREPA should be a solvent entity, at least on paper. As Professor Ramón Cao has stated the “restructured debt is sustainable if, and only if, PREPA is able to effectively operate as an electric utility after the implementation” of the plan of adjustment.[13] This issue is more than a mere accounting technicality. If PREPA is still insolvent, even after exiting the negotiation process, then it is questionable whether the plan of adjustment would be confirmable by the Court. While PROMESA does not require that solvency be established to confirm a plan of adjustment, it does require that it be “viable” and certainly solvency is at least one component of any “viability” analysis.

Debt reduction, therefore, has to be drastic. According to PREPA’s Monthly Report to its Governing Board for the Month of December 2021, PREPA’s liabilities totaled $18.1 billion, while its assets added to $10.1 billion, a difference of $8 billion. In theory, then, that is the minimum amount — $8 billion or 44% of all liabilities — by which all of PREPA’s obligations would have to be reduced in order to keep it as a minimally sustainable going concern post-restructuring.

Again, PROMESA does not require that solvency be established in order to confirm a plan of adjustment, but it would be extremely ironic, not to say utterly irrational, to finish this expensive five-year process with an entity that is still technically insolvent. On the other hand, the approach proposed by Professor Cao appears to be reasonable. It seeks the answer to one question: would PREPA be solvent on a balance sheet and cash flow basis after giving effect to the proposed transaction? Doing that analysis for a stand-alone entity such as PREPA is relatively easy, especially in comparison with the complex nature of Puerto Rico’s central government finances.

For the sake of clarity, we are not arguing in favor of reducing every single creditor’s claim against PREPA by 44%. Instead, our point is, based on Professor Cao’s methodology, that PREPA’s total obligations should be reduced on average by 44%. The amount of the actual impairment of each creditor’s claim would be the subject of negotiation or litigation among the parties.

Fourth, eliminate the securitization structure. Under the terms of recently terminated RSA, the parties to the agreement would have exchanged their existing bonds for new bonds (the “New Bonds”) to be issued by a “special purpose public corporation and instrumentality of the Government of Puerto Rico, constituting a corporate and political entity independent and separate from the Government of Puerto Rico, PREPA and any other Government Entity.”[14]

The repayment of the New Bonds would have been secured by a lien on the future cash flow generated by PREPA through the imposition of a Transition Charge. This was a special charge that would have been added to the amount billed to PREPA’s customers and used solely to pay the New Bonds. The Transition Charge was designed to increase over time, from 2.768 c/kWh during the first fiscal year after the issuance of the New Bonds up to a cap of 4.552 c/kWh during fiscal year 2044 and thereafter.

This so-called “securitization structure” would have guaranteed the repayment of the New Bonds regardless of PREPA’s operational situation and would have represented a significant upgrade of the bondholder’s collateral package. PREPA legacy bonds are “special revenue bonds” which are commonly issued by governmental agencies that provide such basic services as transportation, water, sewers, electricity, gas for heating, and so on. The repayment guarantee for these bonds, as is the case with the existing PREPA bonds, is a lien against the net revenues (after payment of the operating costs of the issuer) generated by the issuer. We see no reason for upgrading this security structure or for substantially modifying PREPA’s current relative repayment priorities, unless creditors provide an infusion of new money, something analogous to a debtor in possession financing, or some other similar consideration.

Fifth, keep in mind that any rate increase to pay off debt will have negative economic consequences. Electricity prices affect economic activity and economic activity affects electricity prices. Under the 2019 RSA, PREPA would have started billing the Transition Charge in the near term, while any savings from switching to cheaper fuel sources and other cost-saving measures would probably have taken several years to materialize.

In theory, as some FOMB have representatives have argued, it is possible that the imposition of the Transition Charge or a similar special charge to pay off debt would not necessarily have entailed a rate increase for customers, so long as PREPA reduced its system-wide operating costs by an amount equal to or greater than the Transition Charge. In practice, achieving that amount of cost reduction would be very difficult, given the state of PREPA’s operations, and PREPA’s prior history of mismanaged initiatives to reduce costs certainly casts a shadow on its ability to reduce costs by an amount that would offset any such special charge.

Therefore, it is highly probable that rates would have increased significantly under the old RSA due to the Transition Charge. Professor Cao estimated that increasing rates by the amount of the Transition Charge would have reduced GNP in Puerto Rico by 8.1% in real terms by 2024 relative to actual GNP at constant prices in FY2017 and induced a reduction in total employment of 33,382 jobs by 2024, equivalent to 3.4% of total employment in FY2018.[15]

Lower economic activity and employment would, in turn, reduce the demand for electricity. According to estimates by Professor Cao, demand for electricity by residential, commercial, and industrial consumers would have declined by 21.8%, 7.8%, and 34.2%, respectively by fiscal year 2024 relative to electricity consumption in fiscal year 2017.[16]

Lower demand for electricity would force PREPA to further increase its rates to cover operating costs and meet its obligations. Failure to do so would result in the deferment of capital investments and/or maintenance costs, which would adversely affect the quality of service. And under that scenario, we could expect an increase in “grid defection.” That is, we could expect an increase in the number of customers switching to their own generation sources or connecting “informally” to the PREPA grid, “leaving only the customers that cannot afford to leave the PREPA service franchise; those are the customers that are least likely to be able to afford to pay for the rising electricity rates.”[17]

Conclusion

The recently terminated PREPA RSA was the third failed attempt to restructure at least a portion of PREPA’s debt. Judge Taylor Swain in her March 8 Order expressed her concern that “the termination announcement presents the risk of a major setback in progress toward readjustment of PREPA’s liabilities.”[18] She also imposed a tight deadline for the FOMB to commence a mediation process and file a plan of adjustment, or a term sheet thereof; submit a schedule for the litigation of pending issues; or show cause as to why the Court should not dismiss the Title III case. Time, therefore, is of the essence.

However, while we fully understand the desire to expeditiously conclude this process after five years of expensive and drawn-out negotiations, it is just as important to get right both the process and the substance of the debt restructuring.

In procedural terms, we believe an inclusive mediation process is the best alternative to achieve a viable agreement among the parties, especially in contrast with the alternatives of prolonged litigation or the dismissal of the Title III case.

In terms of the substance of the transaction, our view is that any proposed plan of adjustment to restructure PREPA’s liabilities has to (1) take into account the complicated environment in which PREPA operates; (2) result in a restructured PREPA that is solvent; (3) reduce PREPA’s total obligations by at least 44%; (4) be based on a net revenue lien on PREPA’s revenues, and (5) minimize any rate increases to pay off debt.

Anything less would probably result in a defective debt restructuring, raising the specter of a new bankruptcy within the next five years.

End Notes

[1] PREPA Docket Entry No. 2748.

[2] Id. at p. 10.

[3] Id. at pp. 10-11.

[4] Id. at p. 12.

[5] Id. at p. 13.

[6] FOMB – Letter – Legislative Leaders – PREPA Regarding Mediation – March 14, 2022.

[7] Id.

[8] Docket Entry No. 20357 at p. 2.

[9] London Economics International LLC, Critique of Government Parties’ Assertion that the 9019 Settlement will Not Affect Non-settling Creditors and Will Avoid a Subsequent Tittle III Filing by PREPA, October 30, 2019, (the “LEI Report”), p. 22. The LEI Report was prepared for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority.

[10] Id.

[11] Id. at p. 97. With respect to the first $16.4 billion we note that as of the date of this Policy Brief, FEMA and HUD have committed to fund only approximately $12 billion of the required T&D capital expenditures.

[12] Id. at p. 4.

[13] Ramón J. Cao García, An Independent Evaluation of PREPA’s Financial Sustainability and its Impact on Proposed Restructuring Support Agreement, PROMESA Proceedings and Funding Scenarios on PREPA Planned Capital Investments, May 19, 2020, (the “Cao Report 2”), p. 4 and p. 7.

[14] Definitive Restructuring Support Agreement, Exhibit C (Recovery Plan Term Sheet), Annex A (Securitization Term Sheet), Schedule I-B (Securitization Protections), p. I-B-1.

[15] Ramón J. Cao García, An Independent Economic Evaluation of the Definitive Restructuring Support Agreement for Outstanding PREPA’s Debt, of PREPA Fiscal Plan and a Modest Proposal, August 30, 2019, (the “Cao Report 1”), p. 20 and p. 24.

[16] Id. at p. 27, p. 28, and p. 30.

[17] LEI Report, p. 65.

[18] March 8 Order at p. 10.

A Short History of the Demise of Puerto Rico’s Electric System

A Short History of the Demise of Puerto Rico’s Electric System

Published on October 21, 2021

Sergio portrait
Policy Director
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The recent outages of Puerto Rico’s electric system have generated plenty of uninformed debate. That situation prompted us to go through the archives and look up the Official Statements for PREPA’s last two bond offerings, dated April 12, 2012 (the “2012 OS’) and August 15, 2013 (the “2013 OS”), respectively. These documents contain a wealth of data and information about Puerto Rico’s electricity system.

First, we note that PREPA had already been reporting operating losses for several years in a row. According to the 2013 OS: “For each of the last four fiscal years the Authority incurred losses before contributed capital in accordance with GAAP. These losses reflect the continuation of a historical trend of net losses that have resulted in a deficit in the Authority’s consolidated net assets of $515.7 million as of June 30, 2012. This means that…the Authority’s total liabilities of $10.8 billion exceed its total assets of $10.3 billion.” (2013 OS, p. 21). In other words, PREPA was already insolvent, on a balance sheet basis, as of the end of fiscal year 2012.

Furthermore, during fiscal years 2011, 2012, and 2013, “due to liquidity constraints the Authority had a need to use lines of credit and Power Revenue Bonds to finance its operational expenses.” (2013 OS, p. 22). By diverting debt proceeds to pay for operational expenses, this practice limited the amount of funds available for financing the capital expenditures necessary for system maintenance. This affected the maintenance of the entire system, including the generation component, as “about half of the $787.5 million in capital expenditures for the five fiscal years ended June 30, 2013 for production plant was spent for such scheduled maintenance.” (2013 OS, p.38).

The combination of low liquidity; funding current spending with long-term debt; and limited access to the capital markets due to increased levels of indebtedness and debt service, resulted in a significant reduction in system maintenance expenditures from $250.6 million during fiscal year 2007 to $213.9 million during fiscal year 2013, a decrease of $36.7 million, or 14.6%. (2012 OS, p. 71 and 2013 OS, p. 58)

The lack of maintenance, in turn, affected overall system performance. Between 2007 and 2011, generation availability decreased from 84% in 2007 to 78.9% in 2011; while the forced outage rate increased from 10% to 15.8%, during the same period. (2012 OS, p. 51). Meanwhile, the reserve capacity available as a percentage of peak load was forecast to decrease from 77% in 2014 to 67% in 2018. (2013 OS, p. 40).

Such was the neglected state of Puerto Rico’s electricity system — an old, unreliable, fossil fuel-based generation fleet connected to a functional but fragile and unstable transmission and distribution grid — when PREPA and the government of Puerto Rico executed a long-term agreement for the operation and maintenance of the electric grid (the “O&M Agreement”) with LUMA, a Canadian/Texan consortium.

Under the O&M Agreement, keeping the lights on requires hand-in-glove coordination between PREPA and LUMA. PREPA is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the generation fleet, while LUMA is in charge of funding PREPA on a monthly basis and deciding which generation resources interconnect with the grid, at what time, and in which order. Given the complicated character of this relationship, the recent rolling blackouts are probably as much a function of a decrepit generation fleet and an unstable transmission and distribution grid, as of a series of coordination failures between PREPA and LUMA.

In sum, Puerto Rico’s energy woes were years in the making and are the direct result of PREPA’s mismanagement, negligence, and corruption.

However, PREPA’s indictment is not LUMA’s vindication. LUMA had a year to prepare for the takeover of the electricity grid and its performance so far has been, in the best case, deficient. Its management’s obstinate refusal to submit to any accountability processes is downright Nixonian.

Both PREPA and LUMA bear responsibility for the recent malfunctioning of Puerto Rico’s electricity system. The O&M Agreement requires good faith efforts from both companies to run the system successfully. We suspect, though, that PREPA is clinging to its old ways of doing things, while LUMA has not understood it needs to modify its standard playbook to account for an old, unstable, and unreliable electric system. It is in the best interests of both companies to change their ways, for their own benefit and the wellbeing of the Puerto Rican people.

This column was originally published in the Caribbean Business on October 21, 2021.

CNE Review – October 2021

Published on October 21, 2021 / Leer en español

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In This Issue

In the past few weeks, we have been hearing diverse opinions as to who bears responsibility for the recent rolling blackouts. Some are placing the blame on LUMA, others on the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA). Prompted by these discussions, we find it necessary to, once again, address the current energy crisis.

In this edition of the CNE Review, we will take a look at some of the early events that foretold the demise of Puerto Rico’s energy system, such as PREPA’s operating losses and increased levels of indebtedness, to the shortcomings of the recent agreement with LUMA for the operation and maintenance of the electric grid. We also provide recommendations as to what can be done to tackle the ongoing crisis.

Keep reading for a summary of our analysis. Click here to access the full text.

Insights + Analysis from CNE

The Demise of Puerto Rico’s Electrical System

By Sergio M. Marxuach, Policy Director

We have been hearing some rosy statements about how well the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”) used to work. it would be a mistake to romanticize the old PREPA. As we will demonstrate below, things were not all copacetic when PREPA was in charge. Puerto Rico’s energy woes were years in the making and are the direct result of PREPA’s mismanagement, negligence, and corruption.

However, PREPA’s indictment is not LUMA’s vindication. LUMA had about a year to prepare for the takeover of Puerto Rico’s electricity grid and its performance so far has been, in the best case, deficient, and in the worst, dismal. Its management, so far, has utterly failed to deliver on its promises.

Thus, it is important to keep in mind that both PREPA and LUMA bear responsibility for the recent malfunctioning of Puerto Rico’s electricity system. It is in the best interests of both companies to change their ways, for their own benefit and the wellbeing of the Puerto Rican people.

Interpreting PREPA’s last two bond offerings

The Official Statements for PREPA’s last two bond offerings, dated April 12, 2012 (the “2012 OS”) and August 15, 2013 (the “2013 OS”), respectively, contain a wealth of data and information about Puerto Rico’s electricity system.

After close scrutiny of these documents, we found that a combination of (1) low liquidity; (2) funding current spending with long-term debt; and (3) limited access to the capital markets due to increased levels of indebtedness and debt service, resulted in a significant reduction in system maintenance expenditures from $250.6 million during fiscal year 2007 to $213.9 million during fiscal year 2013, a decrease of $36.7 million, or 14.6%. (2012 OS, p. 71 and 2013 OS, p. 58)

The lack of maintenance, in turn, affected overall system performance as demonstrated by several key metrics.

Click here to read more about the three main reasons why system maintenance expenditures were reduced and the particular ways in which the system’s performance was affected.

A Series of Unfortunate Events?

While PREPA officially claimed that it suffered from a series of unfortunate events caused by a menagerie of small animals, the truth is that by the time PREPA filed for bankruptcy in May 2017 the system was already thoroughly fragile, with decreasing available capacity; increasing outage rates; and limited available reserves. And then Hurricane María hit, devastating the transmission and distribution system in September 2017.

Despite the massive effort to restore electric service after Hurricane Maria, it was always understood that it was not a permanent fix — a thorough refurbishing of the grid was necessary to bring it up to 21st century standards. PREPA estimated such refurbishing would cost north of $10 billion. Years of negotiations with FEMA followed, until an agreement was reached in December 2020. In the meantime, the patched-up grid kept acting up. On the generation side not much happened either, as evidenced by the continued dispatch of the Palo Seco generation plant.

The Arrival of LUMA

Such was the neglected state of Puerto Rico’s electricity system — an old, unreliable, fossil fuel-based generation fleet connected to a functional but fragile and unstable transmission and distribution grid — when PREPA and the government of Puerto Rico executed a long-term agreement for the operation and maintenance of the electric grid (the “O&M Agreement”) with LUMA, a Canadian/Texan consortium.

The video below (in Spanish) summarizes what LUMA and PREPA are each in charge of and the extent of coordination needed between the two entities.

That coordination is executed in accordance with the terms and conditions of another agreement among and between PREPA, LUMA, and the Puerto Rico P3 Authority (“P3”): the GridCo – GenCo Power Purchase & Operating Agreement (the “PPOA”). Click here to read some of the key terms and conditions of the PPOA.

In a nutshell, PREPA is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the generation fleet, while LUMA is in charge of funding PREPA’s operations on a monthly basis and dispatching load into the grid. Given the complicated character of this relationship, we suspect that the recent rolling blackouts are as much a function of (1) a decrepit generation fleet and an unstable transmission and distribution grid as of (2) a series of coordination failures between PREPA and LUMA.

What can we expect moving forward and what can we do?

Given this state of affairs, this is what we can expect…

  • It will take about 10 years to upgrade the transmission and distribution system, with or without LUMA. This task is exceedingly complex and expensive. And there are no shortcuts.
  • The modernization of the generation fleet will also take several years, be it with additional natural gas capacity, increased generation from renewable sources, or a combination of both.
  • The above means that in the short term electric service in Puerto Rico will continue to be unreliable and expensive.
  • Rising fossil fuel prices (including natural gas), the unavailability of several low-cost generation units to meet base load due to unforeseen breakdowns, and the obligation to eventually start paying debt service on PREPA’s restructured indebtedness, will be the main drivers of the cost of electricity in Puerto Rico.

…and what we hope can be done:

  • Nonetheless, some remedial measures could be implemented in the short term to stabilize the transmission and distribution system and to reduce the dependence on the use of high-cost peaking units. It is up to both PREPA and LUMA to identify those “quick wins” and execute them.
  • In addition, the transition to renewable generation must continue. The generation of electricity using renewable sources protects both the environment, by lowering emissions of greenhouse gases, and consumers, by stabilizing the price of electricity. It is not true that electricity from renewable sources is always more expensive than electricity generated with traditional fuels. The technology for solar and/or wind generation in combination with battery storage has developed significantly during the last few years, in some cases approaching the costs of natural gas generation.
  • Furthermore, in order to properly compare costs between one kind of generation and another, it is necessary to add the cost of the environmental and health damages caused by fossil fuel generation. Adding in the costs of these negative externalities almost always reveals that fossil generation is costlier than initially thought. The imposition of a carbon tax is one of several policy alternatives to force polluters to internalize the cost of these negative externalities they impose on society at large.
  • Finally, it is imperative that the government agencies in charge of implementing energy policy in Puerto Rico have the necessary resources to execute their respective missions: (1) the PREB to regulate rates and promote long-term planning for the system; (2) the P3 Authority to effectively monitor and robustly enforce the O&M Agreement with LUMA; and (3) PREPA to adequately coordinate the day-to-day operation of the generation system.

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On Our Radar...

Climate Change – This fall, from October 31 through November 12, the 26th gathering of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change, or COP26 for short, will take place in Glasgow. According to a recent paper published by Chatham House, if emissions of greenhouse gases follow the current trajectory “there is a less than five per cent chance of keeping temperatures well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and less than one per cent chance of reaching the 1.5°C target set by the 2015 Paris Agreement”…and “many of the climate change impacts described in this research paper are likely to be locked in by 2040, and become so severe they go beyond the limits of what nations can adapt to.”

How Democracies Die – The breakdown of democratic regimes has been studied for decades by historians, sociologists, and political scientists. What is different now, is that many of those analyses focus on the United States, including this thought-provoking essay published in The Atlantic by Eliot A. Cohen, where he concludes that if the U.S. “succumbs to its internal divisions, to its preoccupation with partisan feuding and its desire to withdraw from international politics, the world order, such as it is, will crumble.”

The Future of Work – In this interesting op-ed for the New York Times, Jonathan Malesic writes that “work sits at the heart of Americans’ vision of human flourishing. It’s much more than how we earn a living. It’s how we earn dignity: the right to count in society and enjoy its benefits. It’s how we prove our moral character. And it’s where we seek meaning and purpose, which many of us interpret in spiritual terms…But work often doesn’t live up to these ideals. In our dissent from this vision and our creation of a better one, we ought to begin with the idea that each one of us has dignity whether we work or not. Your job, or lack of one, doesn’t define your human worth.”

The Short Memory of the Masters of Disaster

The Short Memory of the Masters of Disaster

Published on October 20, 2021 / Leer en español

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Policy Director
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Introduction

Historians, whenever possible, try to work using primary sources — diplomatic cables, a ship captain’s log, a soldier’s diary, ancient pictographs from a scroll— for a reason. Human memory is short and fallible, while written records can faithfully preserve first-hand accounts of human folly, in theory, forever. Of course, interpretations of those sources can and should be challenged, but once a source’s authenticity has been established its evidentiary value is beyond reproof.

Recently, we have been hearing some unreasonably rosy statements about how well the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”) used to work. What caught my attention was that these utterances were not made by the usual suspects, by which I mean people who speak in hushed and reverent tones about “Governor Tugwell” and “Mr. Luchetti”, the “glory that was PREPA” and how it was the “crown jewel”. To them I say, well, sic transit and good luck with that — all those things happened a long time ago. Those of us who have lived through PREPA’s implosion should know better.

That is why I looked up the Official Statements for PREPA’s last two bond offerings, dated April 12, 2012 (the “2012 OS”) and August 15, 2013 (the “2013 OS”), respectively. These documents contain a wealth of data and information about Puerto Rico’s electricity system. And they tend to be accurate, as they are prepared in accordance with federal securities laws.

Speak, Memory

So what did we find? First off, we found that as of August 2013, PREPA had been reporting operating losses for several years in a row. According to the 2013 OS: “For each of the last four fiscal years the Authority incurred losses before contributed capital in accordance with GAAP. These losses reflect the continuation of a historical trend of net losses that have resulted in a deficit in the Authority’s consolidated net assets of $515.7 million as of June 30, 2012. This means that, as of June 30, 2012, the Authority’s total liabilities of $10.8 billion exceed its total assets of $10.3 billion.” (2013 OS, p. 21). In other words, PREPA was already insolvent, on a balance sheet basis, as of the end of fiscal year 2012.

Furthermore, during fiscal years 2011, 2012, and 2013 PREPA’s liquidity deteriorated significantly and “due to liquidity constraints the Authority had a need to use lines of credit and Power Revenue Bonds to finance its operational expenses.” (2013 OS, p. 22). This practice raises a red flag for two reasons. First, using long-term debt to finance operating expenses is always first and foremost a clear sign of financial distress. And, second, by diverting debt proceeds to pay for operational expenses, this practice limited the amount of funds available for financing the capital expenditures necessary for system maintenance. This affected the maintenance for the entire system, including the generation component, as “about half of the $787.5 million in capital expenditures for the five fiscal years ended June 30, 2013 for production plant was spent for such scheduled maintenance.” (2013 OS, p.38).

By 2013 it was well known that PREPA relied too much on debt to finance its capital improvement program. Indeed, both the 2012 OS and the 2013 OS state that such reliance “has caused the Authority’s level of indebtedness and related debt service requirements to increase significantly” and “the Authority’s Consulting Engineers have recommended that the Authority increase the amount of its capital improvement program funded from internally-generated sources.” (2012 OS, p. 17 and 2013 OS, p. 21). Alas, PREPA never did comply with that recommendation.

It should not be surprising then that this combination of (1) low liquidity; (2) funding current spending with long-term debt; and (3) limited access to the capital markets due to increased levels of indebtedness and debt service, resulted in a significant reduction in system maintenance expenditures. And that is exactly what the Official Statements demonstrate, a reduction in maintenance spending, from $250.6 million during fiscal year 2007 to $213.9 million during fiscal year 2013, a decrease of $36.7 million, or 14.6%. (2012 OS, p. 71 and 2013 OS, p. 58)

The lack of maintenance, in turn, affected overall system performance. Between 2007 and 2011, the annualized electric generation equivalent availability decreased significantly, from 84% in 2007 to 78.9% in 2011; while the equivalent forced outage rate (an indication of the average percentage of total dependable generating capacity which is unavailable throughout the year due to forced outages or partial generating capacity outages) increased considerably, from 10% to 15.8%, during the same period. (2012 OS, p. 51). Meanwhile, the Dependable Reserve Margin, which is the reserve capacity available as a percentage of peak load, was forecast to decrease from 77% in 2014 to 67% in 2018. (2013 OS, p. 40).

A Series of Unfortunate Events?

So, while PREPA officially claimed that it suffered from a series of unfortunate events caused by a veritable menagerie of small animals, both feral and domestic — wandering cats, leaping lizards, hopping iguanas, and critters of a hitherto unknown genus and species that ostensibly “lived” inside electricity meters — most of which presumably faced a ghastly demise by coming into contact with the wrong end of a 13 kV line, the truth is that by the time PREPA filed for bankruptcy in May 2017 the system was already thoroughly fragile, with decreasing available capacity; increasing outage rates; and limited available reserves. The masters of disaster have a short memory, indeed.

And then Hurricane María hit, devastating the transmission and distribution system in September 2017. According to data from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”), within hours of Hurricane María’s landfall in Puerto Rico, 100 percent of PREPA’s clients were without electric power service and 80 percent of its infrastructure was destroyed. After a slow start, tainted by some unbecoming shenanigans involving two fly-by-night corporations based in the mainland, it took several billion dollars and the better part of a year to restore electric service throughout the island.

However, as important and massive as that job was, it was always understood that it was not a permanent fix — a thorough refurbishing of the grid was necessary to bring it up to 21st century standards. PREPA estimated such refurbishing would cost north of $10 billion. Years of negotiations with FEMA followed, until an agreement was reached in December 2020. In the meantime, the patched-up grid kept acting up.

On the generation side not much happened either, as evidenced by the continued dispatch of the Palo Seco generation plant, a fantastically aged contraption, described by a former Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy in a 2019 Congressional hearing as a “defunct facility.” To be fair, two generation units of the San Juan plant were recently “upgraded” to burn natural gas, but through a suspicious transaction that is currently under scrutiny by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

The Plot Thickens

Such was the neglected state of Puerto Rico’s electricity system — an old, unreliable, fossil fuel-based generation fleet connected to a functional but fragile and unstable transmission and distribution grid — when PREPA and the government of Puerto Rico executed a long-term agreement for the operation and maintenance of the electric grid (the “O&M Agreement”) with LUMA, a Canadian/Texan consortium.

Under the O&M Agreement, PREPA is in charge of the generation (along with a couple of private generators) and LUMA is in charge of the transmission grid. In practice, though, things are seldom so clear cut; because if electricity is to be delivered to the final customers, then PREPA and LUMA have to interconnect and closely coordinate the amount of energy loaded into the system at any given time.

In general, the demand and supply of electricity have to be balanced at all times. If the transmission lines are congested because the load exceeds the demand then the grid will not accept additional load and some generation will shut down. Conversely, if demand exceeds the capacity of the grid to deliver electricity at any given time, then parts of the transmission and distribution system will go offline. So, keeping the lights on requires a kind of hand-in-glove coordination between PREPA and LUMA, as PREPA runs the generation fleet but LUMA determines which generation resources interconnect with the grid, at what time, and in which order.

That coordination is ostensibly executed in accordance with the terms and conditions of another agreement among and between PREPA, LUMA, and the Puerto Rico P3 Authority: the GridCo – GenCo Power Purchase & Operating Agreement (the “PPOA”). To the best of our knowledge, the PPOA has not been made public, but Exhibit H to the O&M Agreement sets forth a term sheet for the PPOA. According to the term sheet, these are some of the key terms and conditions of the PPOA:

  • Pursuant to the PPOA, GenCo agrees to sell and GridCo agrees to accept delivery of and purchase the Energy and/or Dependable Capacity of the Generating Facilities, which shall not be reduced except as provided by the PPOA.
  • Each Generating Facility will be assigned a “Dependable Capacity” which is the net electric generating capacity (gross electric generating capacity less station use) in kW, as determined by testing to be performed from time to time pursuant to the PPOA, which shall also determine the optimal output to meet system load requirements at the lowest possible cost to reliably service customers while recognizing the operational limits of the generation facilities…
  • For any contract year…GenCo shall prepare and deliver to the T&D Operator (with copy to GridCo)…its proposed operations and maintenance budget (the “Operating Budget”) and proposed capital budget (the “Capital Budget”, together with the Operating Budget, the “Budgets”) for such year, together with financial forecasting for the following two (2) contract years.
  • The Operating Budget for any contract year shall include a month-by-month estimate of (i) the working capital reasonably determined by GenCo to be needed for the day-to-day operation of GenCo, (ii) fixed and variable operations and maintenance costs, and (iii) costs and expenses associated with fuel purchases (including a two percent (2%) in excess of the total amount for excess expenditures that may arise in any contract year), in each case for the following contract year.
  • GridCo shall pay GenCo a monthly amount based on the approved budgets, including any costs and expenses for approved capital improvements relating to the Generating Facilities and related supplemental working capital and all costs and expenses associated with the operation and maintenance of a ramped down unit and/or Generating Facility (the “Monthly Generation O&M Charge”).
  • The T&D Operator, as agent of GridCo and dispatch manager, shall at its sole discretion have the right to dispatch the units at the Generating Facilities within their operational limits and in accordance with the principles related to the dispatch of power and electricity set forth in Schedule 1 to Annex I (Scope of Services) of the T&D O&M Agreement.

So there you have it. PREPA is required to provide “dependable generation capacity” in exchange for a monthly payment from LUMA to cover operating and maintenance expenses, as well as approved capital expenditures; while LUMA has absolute control to dispatch generation and manage system load at any given time.

Notice the complex nature of the current arrangement: PREPA is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the generation fleet, while LUMA is in charge of funding PREPA’s operations on a monthly basis and dispatching load into the grid. Given the complicated character of this relationship, we suspect that the recent rolling blackouts are as much a function of (1) a decrepit generation fleet and an unstable transmission and distribution grid as of (2) a series of coordination failures between PREPA and LUMA.

Given this state of affairs, this is what we can expect and what we hope can be done:

  • It will take about 10 years to upgrade the transmission and distribution system, with or without LUMA. This task is exceedingly complex and expensive. And there are no shortcuts.
  • The modernization of the generation fleet will also take several years, be it with additional natural gas capacity, increased generation from renewable sources, or a combination of both.
  • The above means that in the short term electric service in Puerto Rico will continue to be unreliable and expensive.
  • Rising fossil fuel prices (including natural gas), the unavailability of several low-cost generation units to meet base load due to unforeseen breakdowns, and the obligation to eventually start paying debt service on PREPA’s restructured indebtedness, will be the main drivers of the cost of electricity in Puerto Rico.
  • Nonetheless, some remedial measures could be implemented in the short term to stabilize the transmission and distribution system and to reduce the dependence on the use of high-cost peaking units. It is up to both PREPA and LUMA to identify those “quick wins” and execute them.
  • In addition, the transition to renewable generation must continue. The generation of electricity using renewable sources protects both the environment, by lowering emissions of greenhouse gases, and consumers, by stabilizing the price of electricity. It is not true that electricity from renewable sources is always more expensive than electricity generated with traditional fuels. The technology for solar and/or wind generation in combination with battery storage has developed significantly during the last few years, in some cases approaching the costs of natural gas generation.
  • Furthermore, in order to properly compare costs between one kind of generation and another, it is necessary to add the cost of the environmental and health damages caused by fossil fuel generation. Adding in the costs of these negative externalities almost always reveals that fossil generation is costlier than initially thought. The imposition of a carbon tax is one of several policy alternatives to force polluters to internalize the cost of these negative externalities they impose on society at large.
  • Finally, it is imperative that the government agencies in charge of implementing energy policy in Puerto Rico have the necessary resources to execute their respective missions: (1) the PREB to regulate rates and promote long-term planning for the system; (2) the P3 Authority to effectively monitor and robustly enforce the O&M Agreement with LUMA; and (3) PREPA to adequately coordinate the day to day operation of the generation system.

Conclusion

While we understand and sympathize with the feelings of frustration expressed by many Puerto Ricans in connection with recent rolling blackouts, it would be a mistake to romanticize the old PREPA. As we have demonstrated above, things were not all copacetic when PREPA was in charge, Puerto Rico’s energy woes were years in the making and are the direct result of PREPA’s mismanagement, negligence, and corruption. Handing control back to the masters of disaster is not an option.

However, PREPA’s indictment is not LUMA’s vindication. LUMA had about a year to prepare for the takeover of Puerto Rico’s electricity grid and its performance so far has been, in the best case, deficient, and in the worst, dismal. Its management, so far, has utterly failed to deliver on its promises.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that both PREPA and LUMA bear some responsibility for the recent malfunctioning of Puerto Rico’s electricity system. The process negotiated under the aegis of the Puerto Rico P3 Authority requires good faith efforts from both companies to run the system successfully. We suspect, though, that PREPA is desperately clinging to its old ways of doing things, while LUMA has probably not internalized the fact that it needs to modify its standard playbook to account for an old, unstable, and unreliable electric system. It is in the best interests of both companies to change their ways, for their own benefit and the wellbeing of the Puerto Rican people.