Table of Contents
Introduction
At the end of the Second World War the United States together with a handful of allies undertook the hard task of establishing a new rules-based order to promote international diplomacy and multilateral security (the United Nations and NATO); reestablish orderly international capital flows (the IMF); jumpstart international investment (the World Bank); and foster international trade (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Building these institutions, among others, was a long process subject to many setbacks. Yet, over the long term, it was largely successful.
In domestic policy terms, most nations in the West adopted a version of a managed or “mixed” economy with a relatively large welfare state, implementing industrial policies to favor “national champions”, promoting export-led growth policies, and incurring significant spending on defense and infrastructure. These mixed economies avoided the “waste of Great Depressions through activist fiscal and monetary policies to keep production near capacity, total demand near to the economy’s productive potential, and employment nearly full.”[1]
In the United States, which was somewhat more averse to direct state intervention in the economy, the government still invested significantly in defense technologies, infrastructure (the national highway system for example), basic science research, and intervened indirectly in the market through government guarantees of private debts. Furthermore, if you “add a progressive tax system, federal and state efforts to increase access to education, robust regulation of the economy, and expansionary fiscal and monetary policies…you have an American mixed economy that looks different from those of continental Europe or Great Britain…but is not in any sense a smaller or less comprehensive set of governmental interventions in the economy.”[2]
The Reagan/Thatcher Era 
However, by the mid-1970s, the postwar social contract regarding state intervention in the economy through Keynesian counter-cyclical policies, strong regulation of the economy, state-ownership of enterprises (mostly in Europe), a large welfare state, and the “idea of social progress as a collective project” was increasingly questioned.[3] The combination of high inflation and unemployment, low productivity growth, outright economic recession and stagnation, price controls, deindustrialization, and the poor performance of nationalized industries, essentially “discredited what was increasingly seen as an unworkably interventionist approach to the economy.”[4]
The crisis of the existing economic order in conjunction with the political unrest generated by opposition to the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, racial conflict in the cities, and the unfulfilled expectations of the Great Society programs, generated a reaction, variously called “the Reagan Dispensation”; the “Reagan-Thatcher Counterrevolution”, or the “Neoliberal Order”.[5]
The neoliberal or Thatcher/Reagan model was based, at least at the level of political rhetoric, on privatization, low taxes, deregulation, cutting back the social safety net, balanced budgets, trade liberalization, the implementation of strongly pro-market “structural reforms”, the maximization of “shareholder value”, and limited government intervention in the economy.
President Reagan tried to implement this neoliberal vision with the support of movement partisans, conservative academics, and inside-the-beltway think tanks, which provided a lot of the policy ideas floated during the 1980s. By the time he left office, though, his legacy was mixed. Reagan did succeed in lowering taxes, reducing or eliminating some regulatory schemes, and cutting a few social assistance programs. But his broader attacks on the welfare state, the size and scope of the U.S. government, and deficit spending fell flat or outright failed.
Where President Reagan did achieve an unalloyed victory was at the level of political discourse and values. His vision, in the words of Mark Lilla, was very attractive to the “relatively affluent, hyperindividualized, and suburbanized society America had become.” Furthermore, it reinforced the feeling that “Americans no longer needed one another as much or owed much to one another.”[6]
The “market” became the measure of all social values. This vision also became very popular across corporate boardrooms, where many C-level executives started preaching the virtues of Hayek and Friedman, the “efficiency” of downsizing, outsourcing, and offshoring, and generally focusing on maximizing “shareholder value” at the expense of corporate obligations to other social stakeholders and the communities (and the nation) where these companies operated.
Globalization in High Gear
After 1991, globalization forces (increases in the flows of goods, services, capital, and people) went into high drive, with the lowering of transaction costs associated with the end of the Cold War and qualitative and quantitative innovations in information technology, transportation, and telecommunications, facilitating the transfer of massive amounts of financial capital and direct investment flows from the United States and other countries to Eastern Europe, Russia (for a few years), China, and India.
According to Gerstle, during the 1990s alone, China’s exports quintupled, while world trade in manufactured goods doubled in the 1990s and doubled again in the 2000s. Furthermore, between roughly 1985 and 2005, “capital flows as a percentage of world income soared to nearly 20 percent from under 10 percent during the early part of the twentieth century.”[7] In sum, “capitalism had become aggressively global in a way it had not been since the First World War.”[8] It is safe to say the globalization cycle was then at a high point.
However, there were costs. By some estimates, “import competition from China between 1999 and 2011 may have cost in the range of 2 to 2.4 million jobs, which was roughly half of the actual job losses in manufacturing over that period.”[9] This was largely foreseeable. According to Richard Freeman, the opening of the former Soviet bloc, China, and India in the 1990s duplicated the size of the global pool of labor from approximately 1.46 billion workers to 2.93 billion.[10] This massive increase in the amount of available labor worldwide shifted the global balance of power between capital and labor in favor of capital. American firms rushed to invest overseas to take advantage of low-wage labor. This large investment outflow resulted in the hollowing out of America’s industrial base and caused many low-wage workers to lose ground as real wages stagnated for decades.
During the period roughly between 1991 and the Great Recession of 2007-08 income and wealth inequality in the United States increased to pre-1930 levels, and “vast sections of the country had become deserted, heartbroken, and angry.”[11] The 2008 financial crisis only highlighted the existing fractures in the neoliberal model and stressed the need for massive government intervention, in the form of extremely low interest rates, and the enactment of the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, among other measures. The neoliberal dream was wilting away.
The Backlash Since 2008
Since the 2008 financial crisis, critics from both the left and the right have acutely questioned the Thatcher/Reagan model of economic growth. And several trends are currently converging, both worldwide and in Puerto Rico, to create the conditions for a rethinking of the process of economic growth and development.
First, in retrospect, it has become obvious that the Thatcher/Reagan model is a tautology. Its internal logic essentially states that the “way to have an economy like Denmark’s is to become Denmark”. In other words, it suffers from one of the “most common misconceptions of economic development theories: the misguided notions that economic prosperity can only occur in places with an excellent business environment and that growth is the result of painful and politically difficult reforms.”[12] Indeed, the challenge for policy practitioners is to jumpstart economic growth and development precisely in places where, by definition, the preconditions for success are missing or suboptimal.
Second, the Thatcher/Reagan model approach to economic growth is ahistorical and failed to take into account local conditions. In the words of economist Dani Rodrik, it favored a simplistic “cookbook recipe” approach to economic growth. This limitation was highlighted as early as 2008 in The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development, drafted by the Commission on Growth and Development led by Nobel Prize-winning economist, Michael Spence.
While the Commission identified some stylized facts associated with sustained and inclusive growth, namely, access to capital in all its forms, openness to the global economy, macroeconomic stability, robust spending in innovation, research, and development, and stable institutions, it also pointed out that:
We do not know the sufficient conditions for growth. We can characterize the successful economies of the postwar period, but we cannot name with certainty the factors that sealed their success, or the factors they could have succeeded without. It would be preferable if it were otherwise. Nonetheless, the commissioners have a keen sense of the policies that probably matter— the policies that will make a material difference to a country’s chances of sustaining high growth, even if they do not provide a rock-solid guarantee. Just as we cannot say this list is sufficient, we cannot say for sure that all the ingredients are necessary…A list of ingredients is not a recipe, and our list does not constitute a growth strategy.[13]
Yet the Thatcher/Reagan model was based precisely on this kind of one-size-fits-all formula and on the premise that economic growth is nothing more than the sum of the aggregate effects of a disparate set of structural reforms, which if implemented would somehow generate growth anywhere and everywhere, regardless of local conditions, history, or institutional framework.
It should not be surprising, then, that these policies did not yield the widespread growth its proponents promised. For instance, Professor James K. Galbraith describes the European experience with structural reforms in the following terms:
Europe’s economy today makes nonsense of claims that “structural reform” is the key to growth. Structural reform has been tried throughout Europe; it has produced growth nowhere. Granted, the enactments often fall short of the promises; but each shortfall and each failure to show results sparks a call for more reforms—the true mark of fanaticism. The governments that continue to comply do so cynically: in Greece to escape (unsuccessfully, so far) from the bailout; in Italy to strengthen Mr. Renzi’s EU negotiating stance. Very few in countries stricken by structural reforms delude themselves into thinking they will work.[14]
Furthermore, both the IMF and the OECD have also concluded that supply-side structural reforms have, at best, a marginal effect on growth, and at worst, no or negative effects on medium to long-term growth rates. [15]
Yet, by deepening existing inequalities and eroding the social safety net, structural reform programs created the conditions for the emergence of anti-system politics that have fueled the political polarization and social unrest we have seen around the globe and which have been articulated in the United States, specifically, first by the Tea Party and the Occupy Wall Street movements, and more recently, by the conservative populism of the Republican Party and by a radically progressive faction within the Democratic Party. [16]
The Post-COVID Reassessment
The global COVID-19 pandemic triggered a re-evaluation of the role of the state in the economy and called into question the benefits of overly-globalized supply chains. Many households (though by no means all) in the highly developed economies managed to escape the worst economic effects of the pandemic only due to the timely implementation of robust fiscal and monetary policy support. While on the supply side, many multinational firms began to consider simplifying as well as adding a layer of redundancy to their supply chains.
These actions, in turn, led many governments to reassess the role of national industrial policies, not only as part of traditional Great Power geopolitical competition but also as a matter of securing access to both key intermediate inputs and final products in the case of a global emergency. The COVID-19 pandemic made it painfully clear that there are problems that require the collaboration of government and the private sector when just letting the “market work its magic” is not enough. The development of the COVID-19 vaccine is a good example. Addressing the challenges of climate change is another.
Since 2021 the U.S. has started to turn away from the neoliberal dogma as Congress enacted about $1.1trillion in direct spending and approximately $551 billion in tax credits to: address the remaining challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic; revitalize the U.S. semiconductor industry; jumpstart the green energy economy; and modernize a significant part of America’s infrastructure, through the American Rescue Plan, the CHIPS and Science Act, the Inflation Reduction Act, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Act.
The Opportunity for Puerto Rico
It is, then, in this global context that Puerto Rico faces the next stage in its economic development. After 15+ years of economic stagnation, a fiscal and debt crisis, the bankruptcy of its government, the damage caused by Hurricanes Irma and María in 2017 and a series of earthquakes beginning in December 2019, and the pain inflicted by the COVID-19 pandemic, Puerto Rico has a once in a generation opportunity to turn its economy around.
First, the debt restructuring process is over. The certified Plan of Adjustment provided significant debt relief to the island by cutting the Commonwealth’s debt by approximately 50%. The jury is still out on whether this amount of debt relief is sufficient. What is clear is that the medium to long-term viability of the Plan depends on jumpstarting economic growth in Puerto Rico.
Second, the Biden Administration has been willing to disburse the money (in excess of $20 billion) appropriated by Congress several years ago to finance hurricane reconstruction efforts, which will allow Puerto Rico to significantly upgrade a large part of its physical infrastructure endowment to 21st century standards in a relatively short period of time (or so we hope).
Finally, the intellectual and political turn towards a more activist state affords Puerto Rico the necessary policy space to develop and implement creative solutions to its economic problems. The zeitgeist is favorable for the development and implementation of a carefully crafted industrial policy for Puerto Rico. Although several key actors have initiated efforts to stimulate growth in individual sectors, no one is looking at the entire puzzle. Here we would do well to follow the advice of Michael Spence when he said “we shouldn’t slip into the mistake of equating something useful, like financial-sector development or anything else, with a sufficient condition for growth.”[17] Without an integrated approach, we risk missing key opportunities for alignment between sectors, along with the lasting synergies that accompany these efforts.
Similarly, we shouldn’t make the mistake of equating a set of structural reforms with an economic strategy. Simply stated, the structural reforms set forth in the Fiscal Plan are not guaranteed to generate the economic growth Puerto Rico requires, both for increasing the living standards of its people and to pay off its restructured debt, unless they are embedded or framed within a larger economic strategy or vision. What Puerto Rico needs, then, is an industrial policy.
New Thinking on Industrial Policy
Over the last decade or so, several scholars have challenged the traditional paradigm of industrial policy as limited to activities mostly related to fixing market failures and coordination problems. Indeed, many countries are pursuing innovation-led “smart” growth, which requires certain types of long-run strategic investments. Mariana Mazzucato, among others, argues that “such investments require public policies that aim to create markets, rather than just ‘fixing’ market failures (or system failures).” The countries following this path, have “public agencies [that] not only ‘de-risked’ the private sector, but also led the way in terms of shaping and creating new technological opportunities and market landscapes” while finding “ways in which both risks and rewards can be shared so that ‘smart’ innovation-led growth can also result in ‘inclusive’ growth.”[18]
A few years ago, we had the opportunity to meet with one of those scholars who are rethinking the field of industrial policy. Robert Devlin was then a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the co-author of the book Breeding Latin American Tigers: Operational Principles for Rehabilitating Industrial Policies (UNECLAC /World Bank, 2011). In this book, Professor Devlin sets forth a comparative analysis of the industrial policies implemented in Australia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Spain, and Sweden; identifies common principles among them; and proposes various ways to implement those principles in Latin America.
First, it is important to clarify that the meaning of the term “industrial policy” has expanded since the early post-war era. It now generally refers broadly to a group of institutions, programs, and public and private organizations working together to achieve an economic transformation in a given country or region.
Furthermore, the objectives of a modern industrial policy are not limited to promoting the transition from a traditional agricultural economy to a modern industrial economy based on manufacturing, but rather it seeks to identify economic sectors, for instance, high technology agriculture, advanced or specialized services, or sophisticated manufacturing, in which a country has an opportunity to create greater added value and thus generate economic growth, as well as new and better jobs.
In this sense, modern industrial policy can be described as a process of discovery and continuous learning that requires close collaboration and coordination between the public sector, the private sector, academia, labor unions, and other non-governmental organizations, in order to generate a structural economic transformation in the medium and long term.
Three Strategic Components
According to Devlin, effective industrial policies have at least three elements in common. First, it is necessary to establish a national strategic vision for the medium and long term. Second, effective collaboration with the private sector, broadly defined, is a critical element. And third, consistency in the execution of industrial policy over time is essential for success.
The first component, the strategic vision, in turn, requires a deep and intellectually honest analysis of the country’s economic situation, its advantages and disadvantages, areas of opportunity, and the capacity of its institutions and organizations to learn, collaborate, and evolve.
After carrying out this introspection exercise, the objective is to determine the strategic orientation of industrial policy in the medium and long term. Devlin has cataloged four strategic orientations, which are not mutually exclusive: (1) the attraction of foreign direct investment; (2) the internationalization of small and medium-sized national companies; (3) the promotion of exports; and (4) innovation.
The capabilities identified in the first part of the analysis determine the strategic orientation of the industrial policy. Thus, we see that some of the ten countries analyzed by Devlin, such as Ireland and Singapore, decided to work on all four strategic directions at the same time, while others such as Australia and Sweden were more selective and decided to focus their resources on only one or two strategic areas.
The second element — collaboration with the private sector — is extremely complex since it requires the capacity on the part of the state to coordinate initiatives and programs, first, among and between the different government agencies in charge of industrial policy and, second, among and between those agencies and key actors in the private sector.
In Ireland, for example, the office of the Prime Minister, coordinates this work, with the help of a permanent secretariat, the National Economic and Social Council, the National Economic and Social Forum, the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, the organization “Enterprise Ireland”, the Irish Development Agency, Forfás, a kind of government “think tank”, and the Advisory Council on Science, Technology and Innovation, among other agencies. Each of these agencies implements a part of the socioeconomic development plan that is updated every three years.
The state, in addition, must have the capacity to establish a productive collaborative relationship with employers, academics, union leaders, and other organizations. The participation of private sector organizations is very important because, while the state retains the power to implement public policy, it is the private sector that has the knowledge and information about the potential of new opportunities for economic development. However, the state, while establishing cooperation mechanisms with the private sector, also has to ensure the common good and avoid rent-seeking or the capture of state institutions by private actors. Executing all these functions is an extremely complex task.
And precisely, the third element is the execution of industrial policy. According to Devlin, it is at this stage that many governments fail catastrophically. A country can design the best economic strategy in the world, but if its state institutions and the private sector cannot execute it, then the effort will not have any significant impact on the economy.
Again, it is necessary to think of industrial policy as an interactive process of strategic cooperation between the private sector and government; which on the one hand, serves to elicit information on business opportunities and constraints and, on the other hand, generates policy initiatives in response. The challenge is to find a middle ground for government bureaucrats between full autonomy and full embeddedness in the private sector. Give too much autonomy to the bureaucrats and you minimize corruption but fail to provide what the private sector really needs. But if bureaucrats become too embedded with the private sector, then they may end up in the pocket of business interests and rent seekers.
And One More
In addition to the elements set forth by Devlin, implementing a successful industrial policy in the 21st century requires a fair apportionment of both risks and rewards between the state and the private sectors. According to Mazzucato:
Having a vision of which way to drive an economy requires direct and indirect investment in particular areas, not just creating the conditions for change. Crucial choices must be made, the fruits of which will create some winners, but also many losers…This situation suggests that it is necessary for such investments to be made in a portfolio approach with some of the upside gains covering the downside losses. In other words, if the public sector is expected to fill in for the lack of private venture capital (VC) money going to early-stage innovation, it should at least be able to benefit from the wins, as private VC does. Otherwise, the funding for such investments cannot be secured.[19]
In an economic environment where the government shapes markets, relying solely on tax revenues may not be sufficient to continually fund a dynamic industrial policy that entails making high-risk investments, many of which will probably fail. Therefore, as Dani Rodrik has suggested, using a portfolio approach to industrial policy means the state should be “able to reap a reward from the wins, in order to fund the losses and the next round. Such direct return-generating mechanisms must be explored, including retaining equity, a share of the IPR [intellectual property rights], and income-contingent loans.”[20]
Reasons for Failure
Industrial policy can fail due to multiple causes. For example, in some countries, the capacity of the state or the private sector to implement a given industrial policy could be overestimated. This lack of capacity in turn produces an implementation gap between the plan’s objectives and the economic reality. That gap, eventually, translates into distrust, apathy, and skepticism between the various social actors and the government.
In other countries, the cause of the failure lies in the extreme politicization of the process and the denial of spaces for participation in the development of the strategy to the political opposition or representatives of other important sectors. It is this participation deficit that eventually causes what Devlin calls the “refounding syndrome” that occurs when a political party comes to power and feels compelled to eliminate all the initiatives of the previous government as it perceives them as illegitimate. A phenomenon with which we are, unfortunately, quite familiar in Puerto Rico.
Finally, failure can result from the lack of an independent system for evaluating and measuring results. In a process as complicated as this, it is inevitable that mistakes will be made or the potential of an economic sector to be overestimated. The important thing is to identify the error in a timely manner, analyze what and why it happened, and promptly redirect resources to other sectors with greater potential. In other words, the key is to “fail fast”.
Traditional Objections in Puerto Rico
When talking about industrial policy in Puerto Rico, two objections immediately arise, both of which are false. The first is that Puerto Rico does not have the political powers or the economic resources to carry out an industrial policy. In fact, Puerto Rico has spent decades negotiating investment agreements with multinational companies and, in terms of resources, the consolidated budget already allocates billions of dollars, both in direct spending and tax incentives, for “economic development”. Where Puerto Rico has failed has been in establishing linkages between the foreign and domestic sectors, in enabling effective knowledge transfers to domestic producers, and in efficiently coordinating government spending on economic development, which is generally carried out in a fragmented way.
The second objection is that the concept of industrial policy is foreign to the political economy of the United States. This statement could not be further from the truth. From its inception to the present day, both the federal government and many states have implemented various kinds of industrial policies, either in a formal and structured way or in an informal and tacit manner. For example, on December 5, 1791, Alexander Hamilton presented to Congress his “Report on the Subject of Manufactures” recommending an economic policy to stimulate the economic growth and industrialization of the newly created nation and which set American economic policy at least through the Civil War.
In more recent times, U.S. industrial policy has been carried out through various agencies, such as NASA, the Department of Defense, and the National Institutes of Health. In fact, many scientific advances, from the creation of the Internet and GPS to basic research in biology and chemistry for the production of medicines, have been funded or partially subsidized by the federal government. On the other hand, at the state level, almost all states, both large ones like Florida and Texas, and small ones like South Carolina, have developed industrial policies to grow and develop the state economy, and in some cases, the surrounding region.
Conclusion
In summary, if Puerto Rico truly wishes to straighten the course of its economy, it is imperative to design a modern industrial policy that puts us at the forefront of global economic activity. The end of the government’s bankruptcy; the full roll-out of the reconstruction efforts; the end of the COVID-19 pandemic; and the intellectual turn in support of a more economically active state, all converge to create the opportunity of a generation for Puerto Rico to turn around its economy and start a process that would generate long-term economic growth and development. It would be a pity if we let this opportunity go to waste.
Endnotes
[1] Stephen S. Cohen and J. Bradford DeLong, The End of Influence: What Happens When Other Countries Have the Money, (Basic Books, New York, 2010), p. 36.
[2] Id. at p. 43.
[3] Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, (Vintage Books, New York, 2000), pp. 327-360.
[4] Martin Wolf, The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism, (Penguin Press, New York, 2023), p. 57.
[5] I use the term neoliberalism reluctantly, as it has been defined in any number of sometimes contradictory ways over time. See, for example, Harold James, The War of Words: A Glossary of Globalization, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2021), pp. 237-261; Mark Lilla, The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics, (HarperCollins, New York, 2017); Wolf, The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism; Gary Gerstle, The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order: America and the World in the Free Market Era, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2022); and Sebastian Edwards, The Chile Project: The Story of the Chicago Boys and the Downfall of Neoliberalism, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2023).
[6] Lilla, The Once and Future Liberal, p. 38.
[7] Michael Weinstein, “Introduction”, Globalization: What’s New?, (Columbia University Press, New York, 2005), p. 2.
[8] Gary Gerstle, The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order: America and the World in the Free Market Era, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2022), pp. 145-146.
[9] Wolf, The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism, pp. 141-142.
[10] Richard Freeman, “The Great Doubling: The Challenge of the New Global Labor Market”, in Ending Poverty in America: How to Restore the American Dream, edited by John Edwards, Marion Crain, and Arne Kallenberg, (New Press, New York, 2007), p. 55.
[11] Mark Lilla, The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics, (HarperCollins, New York, 2017), p. 52.
[12] Justin Yifu Lin and Célestine Monga, Beating the Odds: Jump-Starting Developing Countries, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2017), p. 6.
[13] Commission on Growth and Development, The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development, (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2008), p. 33.
[14] James K. Galbraith, Welcome to the Poisoned Chalice: The Destruction of Greece and the Future of Europe, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2016), p. 43.
[15] See, for example, Dereck Anderson, Bergljot Barkbu, Luisine Lusinyan, y Dirk Muir, “Assessing the Gains from Structural Reforms for Jobs and Growth” in Jobs and Growth: Supporting the European Recovery, (International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 2014); Romain Duval, Davide Furceri, Alexander Hijzen, João Jalles and Sinem Kiliç Celiç, “Time for a Supply-Side Boost? Macroeconomic Effects of Labor and Product Market Reforms in Advanced Economies” in World Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, April 2016), p. 103; Luiza Antoun de Almeida and Vybhavi Balasundharam, On the Impact of Structural Reforms on Output and Employment: Evidence from a Cross-country Firm-level Analysis, IMF Working Paper, WP/18/73, April 2018, p. 13; and Ana Fontura Gouveia, Silvia Santos, and Inês Gonçalves, The Impact of Structural Reforms on Productivity: The Role of the Distance to the Technological Frontier, OECD Productivity Working Papers No. 8, May 2017, p. 13.
[16] See Jonathan Hopkin, Anti-System Politics: The Crisis of Market Liberalism in Rich Democracies, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2020).
[17] Commission on Growth and Development, p. 33.
[18] Mariana Mazzucato, From Market Fixing to Market Creating: A New Framework for Economic Policy, University of Sussex, Science Policy Research Unit, Working Paper Series, SWPS 2015-25 (September), p. 1.
[19] Id. at p. 13.
[20] Dani Rodrik, “Green Industrial Policy”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 30, Number 3, 2014, pp. 469–491.